

## Wittgenstein and Gödel<sup>1</sup>

I wonder that Ludwig Wittgenstein's "fundamental thought" in *Tractatus* / ".. My fundamental thought is that .. the *logic* of the facts cannot be represented" (4.0312 , 4.128 , 6.4321) can be seen to anticipate mutatis mutandis Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems in 1931<sup>2</sup>. Notably the first.

I mean that "the facts" are precisely "***pictures*** of the facts" (1.1 , 1.11 , 1.13 , 2.06 , 2.063 , 2.141 , 3.12 + 3.14 , 4.01 , 4.06). Underlines, boldings and spaces of the paragraphs of *Tractatus* are all (along) mine. If italics is mine I say it, as here in paragraph 4.06 / (1.1 , 1.11 , 1.13 , 2.06.) -

"The picture is a fact". (2.06 , 2.063 , 2.141 , 3.12 + 3.14 , 4.01 , 4.06)

".. the proposition .. in its projektive relation to the world .. is a fact". (1.1 , 1.12 , 1.13 , 2.06 , 2.063 , 2.141 , 3.12\* + 3.14\* , 4.01 , 4.06 ; i.e. to read certain parts\* together)

"The facts" can be read, well studied throughout ((2.06) → 4.06 , 4.1), further (4.25 , 5 , 5.01).

"Propositions can be ***true or false only*** by being ***pictures*** of the reality". (1.1 , 1.12 , 1.13 , 2.06 , 2.063 , 4.06 , 4.1 , 4.25 , 5 , 5.01, italics is mine.)<sup>3</sup>

Thus "the facts" are all (4.001) the well ordered propositions, which can be proved true or false.

That "the facts" are "pictures of the facts" originates from "the aim of the" *Tractatus* ".. to draw a limit to .. the expression of thoughts .. in language .. from within .." (Preface / (4.112 , 4.114)). To wit "the thoughts" are (precisely) "pictures of the facts" (2.06 , 3 , 4 , 4.06) as well.

"The logical picture of the facts is the thought". (2.06 , 2.063 , 3 , 4 , 4.06, underline runs below.)

"A thought is a proposition with a sense". (2.06 , 2.063 , 3 , 4<sup>4</sup> , 4.06 , 4.1 , !4.2 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5.01, italics is mine.)

Why Wittgenstein's aim is what it is ? - In my book because of ! Russell's paradox. Wittgenstein comprehends Russell's paradox straightforward, so that ! there is not any more a single well ordered, consistent and provably true or false proposition (.. but ".. rauschen und brausen .." (*Tractatus*-motto) prevail). Thus there is ".. a *logical* necessity .." (6.375) -

"We make to ourselves pictures of facts .. pictures of the reality". ((2.06) → 2.1 , 2.12 , 2.201 , 4.06 → (4.1 , 4.25 , 5 , 5.01))

The foremost task in *Tractatus* is, how to make consistent and provably true or false propositions. Then ask, i. e. Wittgenstein's aim in *Tractatus*, can all of these (well ordered) propositions be said, ".. be put into words .." (6.552)?

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1 Since this is a short summary of my view of *Tractatus* not all even most essential paragraphs, as I call sentences of *Tractatus*, are with. Anyway in first appendix perhaps the most pivotal paragraphs are given. In fourth appendix the entire *Tractatus* is with. Between, appendix II, there is a picture, an illustration of the well ordered language (to be made (2.1)) in universal language. In appendix III there are still some essential paragraphs (to set out appendix II).

2 And, why not, also Alain Turing's paper in 1936 / negative answer to *Entscheidungsproblem*.

3 "Reality" can be substituted in 4.06 by "the existence and non-existence of states of affairs", or ".. of atomic facts" (2.06), or shortly by "facts" (1.1 , 1.11 , 1.13 , 2.06 , 2.063). Still reading we get ".. pictures .. of the truth and falsehood of the truth-arguments of propositions" (2.06 , 4.06 , 4.1 , 4.25 , 5 , 5.01)

4 "**A sense**" in ***its proof-theoretical*** meaning (4.2 , 4.431); what is needed to decipher "pictures of the reality" (4.06).

To fulfill, or rather to try to fulfill his aim (and to show that it is not possible) Wittgenstein needs a theory of "truth". It is the correspondence theory of "truth"<sup>5</sup> (2.21 , 2.221 , 2.222 , 2.223 , 4.031 , 4.0311) ; not accidentally. The consistency of correspondence theory has to be proven (2.06 , 2.11\* , 2.201 , 2.203\* , 3.02\* , 3.332 , 3.333 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 5 , 5.01). And if it can be done, i. e. (4.0312 , 4.128 , 6.4321), then indirect - vis à vis - ".. Russell's paradox vanishes" (3.333).

So, what is my wondering? - It is at first that we can put in (4.0312) in the place of / "the facts" / following : ".. My fundamental thought is that .. *the logic* of / the well ordered propositions that can be proved true or false / cannot be represented" (4.0312).

Next I interpret "cannot be represented" to mean that \*there is no (general) method or algorithm to deduce .. *beforehand* .. *on one occasion* .." (5.47) all of the well ordered propositions that can be proved true or false<sup>6</sup>. - Well ordered propositions of the correspondence theory.

Altogether I think that *Tractatus* can be seen – at least when it concerns the picture theory - as an complex and wonderful analysis of the **logic** ((2.024 , 4.061) → (2.014 , 2.021 , 2.06 , 2.11 , 2.12 , 2.201 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.203 , 3.3 , 3.332 , 3.333 , 4.06 , 4.2 , 4.23 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.4 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01) **of the correspondence theory, which derives** to the undecidability of "pictures of the reality".

"The logical forms are *anumerical*. ..". (4.0312 → ((2.18 , 2.21 , 4.12 , 4.121) → 4.128) → 6.4321)  
The totality of well ordered propositions .. *cannot* be said .. put into words .." (4.1212 + 6.552).

"The logical forms" are, with minimal reading, interpretation, propositions that can be true or false, i. e. the well ordered propositions that can be proved true or false.

I see that Wittgenstein's "fundamental thought" (4.0312 , 4.128 , 6.4321) is a consistency-result of the correspondence theory, and implies, indirect show ontological realism\*. - "Das Mystische" in *Tractatus* (6.44\* , 6.45 , 6.552) manifests necessarily existing "true", but yet "inexpressible", and so yet unprovable propositions. Them implies ontological realism. Imply? It have to be, for the sake of ! consistency, so that the outside of language existing "reality" cannot be (direct) said ! **in language**. If could, correspondence theory would be a sort of ! Solipsism since "reality" would be nothing but a computational task by enumerating\* all well-ordered propositions .. **if that "saying"\* possible**.<sup>7</sup>

The key question of the picture theory, as a tool, to implement or apply correspondence theory in (universal-) language (where "everything" must be possible in principle to express) is the question of **the relation between language and reality**. - That is because of the **logic** of the correspondence theory (2.024 , 4.061). Correspondence theory's **consistency presupposes that language**, also that "to be done" (2.06 , 2.1 , 4.06) well ordered language, **is independent of reality**. - Therefore **also** consequently **independent of "reality" as "it" have to be defined**, conceived **in** (universal-) *language Itself ! to* .. **make to ourselves pictures of facts .. pictures of the reality**" (2.06 , 2.063 , 2.1 , 2.141 , 3.12 + 3.14 , 4.06), **well ordered propositions ; which**, because of Russell's paradox, **not yet exists**.

5 It is due to the correspondence theory, i. e. its **logic** (2.021 , 2.024 , 3.203 , 3.3 , 4.031 , 4.061) that "the facts" to be made (2.1) in universal language (2.0124) / "substance of the world" (2.021) are "**pictures of the reality**" (1.1 , 2.06 , 2.063 , 2.141 , 3.12 + 3.14 , 4.01 , 4.06) as well ordered, provably true or false propositions. Due to the fact of the logic of the correspondence theory that universal language must be in the beginning independent of reality\*, i. e. no relation to it\*, it will be so as (4.06) says. And since independence presupposes well ordered propositions to be "pictures of the reality" (2.06) to define "reality" is necessary in order to say "pictures of ! "what"". Not to mention "reality" as a basic concept of the correspondence theory need to be (necessarily) defined.

6 This is, mutatis mutandis, the heart of Kurt Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.

7 Solipsism also if not .. make ourselves pictures of facts .. from within ..". (2.1 + 4.114) in language\*, but it\* only.

"Reality" can be defined in (universal-)language without falling into circular argument since language is still independent of reality, i. e. yet no "to be shown" connection, relation to reality. So there is not yet a single proposition that can provably assert its truth value. Because of this independence is due to the correspondence theory, to define "reality" is possible by applying correspondence theory itself in language. Nonetheless it is exactly correspondence theory, whose analysis, i. e. relation ! "whereto"\* asks to conceive "reality"\*. This self-reference is a benefit, less makers, bottom lines.

Thus actually the core of (understanding) the picture theory (as a proof-theory) is that Wittgenstein says in paragraphs (2.022 , 2.023 , 2.16 , 2.161 , 2.17 , 2.18 , 4.03) : ".. The proposition only asserts something, in so far it is a picture" (2.06 , 2.18 , 4.022 , **4.03**<sup>8</sup> , **4.06** , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 5 , **5.01**).

What can, must be done, ".. the task .." (6.4321), is that ".. Reality must .. be completely described by the proposition .." (4.023) - entailing (as such) to define "reality" in language - in order to get the *logic* of all well ordered propositions\* ! to be done (2.1) ! completely as well.

**What must be done is** that what the well ordered propositions\* of the correspondence theory must ".. have in common with reality .. **the logical form.. of reality**". (2.17 , **2.18**) ; so to be able to say, assert their\* truth or falsity (2.21 , **2.22**<sup>9</sup> , 2.221 , **2.222** , **2.223** , 4.03 , 4.031). Indeed, ".. **the logical form .. of reality .. can be shown .. completely ..**" (**2.18** + **4.023** + **4.1212** , 5.4711) **because of "it" is contained in well ordered propositions** (3.13<sup>10</sup> , 3.3 , 3.31 , 3.311 , **3.318** , 4.2 , 4.431). - It is just due to "containing" that "the totality" of well ordered, provably true or false, propositions ".. cannot be said .. put into words .." ((**3.332** , **3.333** → (4.001 , 4.12 , 4.121 , **4.1212** , 4.128 , **6.522**) → 7).

But why Wittgenstein's aim fails ? - **What** is the essential reason, premise (to his aim failing) ?

As said correspondence theory\*'s consistency entails forthwith that its\* language is independent of reality (1.12 , **2.024** , 2.06 , **4.061**). *Else a proposition is also ! an expression of that reality what it, or its sense* (2.21 , 2.221 , 2.222 , 4.031 , 4.0311), *agrees or disagrees*. - Not-independence would mean in the case of "truth" a circular argument, and in the case of "falsity" ! outright contradiction. In the of case of "falsity" a proposition\* would express ! that "truth", which its\* "sense" disagree.

First independence means external relation between language and reality. Correspondence theory may be now consistent, but at the cost of that it's not possible to compare a proposition, or its sense, with reality. A proposition do not reach to reality, to compare. There must exists some other relation than external between language and reality. It's by ".. a *logical* necessity .." (6.375) internal (4.123 , 4.125). - Else to prove truth or falsity of a proposition is impossible and → ~~2.222~~, ~~2.223~~.

It is the question of relation, "internal relation", to "what", i.e. "picture of "what"", that necessitates to define "reality". Thus, as an analysis of the correspondence theory, *Tractatus* begins logically by defining "world" / "reality" (1\* , 1.1 , 1.11 , 1.12 , 2.06 , 2.063, what \* means, look appendix IV.)

8 To assert its "sense" to agree or disagree with reality (2.222) a proposition has to be "a picture" (4.022 , **4.03** , **4.06**).

9 Not until ".. the logical form .. of representantion" (2.17 , 2.18 , **2.2** + **2.22**) makes truth-values (provably) possible.

10 ".. In the proposition .. its sense is not yet contained, but the the possibility of expressing it .. In the proposition the form of its sense is contained, but not its content" (3.13 , 4.2). What is "contained" in a well ordered proposition, is ".. the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of the atomic facts" (4.2 , 4.25 , 5.01). But what ".. is not yet contained .." (3.13) in a well ordered proposition\* is its\* ".. **agreement and disagreement with the the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of the atomic facts**" (4.2), which is ! "**that**" what ".. cannot be said" (4.1212). It is in princible possible to express "the sense" (4.2) of the ".. pictures of the reality" (4.06) precisely ! due to the fact what is ! "contained" in a well ordered proposition. - Yet to fulfil that possibility can't be done (3.332 , 3.333).

The internal relation must exist inside language. Inside that language ! itself where the analysis of correspondence theory's validity will be made, vis-à-vis, self-referential, in that language ! as well defined "reality"<sup>11</sup> (which represents outside existing reality). There is no other place. That "internal relation must exist inside language" is the language-side of Wittgenstein's "substance of the world"-doctrine (2.014 , **2.021** , 3.203 , 3.3). The other, the essential side is made of correspondence theory and its logic, that drives internal relation. - In the end of the road of "the **internal** relation" (2.014 , 2.021 , 2.06 , 2.1 , 2.11 , 2.201 , **2.203** , **3.02** , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.23 , **3.332** , **3.333** , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.23 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.4 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01 , 5.55 , 5.5571 , 7) we will meet Wittgenstein's "fundamental thought" (4.0312 , 4.128 , 6.4321) as an undecidability of "pictures of the reality" ; by the fact that the totality of ".. pictures of the reality .. cannot be .. put into words .." (4.06 + 4.1212 + 6.552).

What first was a (necessary) condition for correspondence theory's consistency, i. e. independence, transforms<sup>12</sup> at the last line to the undecidability of ".. pictures of the reality" (2.18 , 4.06 , 4.128).

To say shortly, tersely the reason why Wittgenstein's aim fails (as he certainly already knows in the beginning of *Tractatus*), it is to say that the well ordered propositions of correspondence theory as "pictures of reality" contain the possibility of (provability of) their **both** "truth" **and** "falsity". This ""both-and"- possibility" can be read clearly by comparing only (2.06 , 2.11\* , **2.203\*** , **3.02\*** , 4.2 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 5.01). In the paragraph 4.2 ".. the possibilities .." are exactly "the possibilities"\* of **both** "truth" **and** "falsity" of ".. the truth-arguments of propositions"\* (5.01), that\* are contained\* in well ordered propositions. **E r g o\*** : "No proposition .. cannot be contained in itself .. because .. already contains .. its own argument .." (3.332 + 3.333, italics is mine.), i. e. ! exactly the possibility of (provability of) "its own" **both** "truth" **and** "falsity". - **IF could, THEN .. contradiction**. Contradiction since now a(n invalid) proposition would , if ".. contained in itself .." (3.332), ! **agree** with the possibility of (provability of) its **both** "truth" **and** "falsity" , **WHICH . . ! "ALREADY CONTAINS"** (3.333 , 4.2 , 4.431).<sup>13</sup> - But how (on earth) ""both-and" possibility" is *consistent!* ""Both-and" possibility" of a proposition is possible if and only if "falsity" is replaced, substituted by **an other proposition**, a "**t r u e**" **proposition**. To deny the "truth" of a proposition, to ! assert the "falsity" of a proposition, presuppose that there exist an other ! "true" proposition which substitutes the "falsity" of the (other) first proposition<sup>14</sup>. To deny, denying the "truth" of a proposition -

".. determines a logical place other .. o u t s i d e .. the denied proposition .." (3.4 , 3.41 , 3.411 , 3.4<sup>15</sup> , 4.064 , 4.0641).

A well ordered proposition ".. contains the prototype of its own argument .." (3.333), and points out of itself (forever) to other propositions with ".. different meanings .." (3.333) if and when (anybody)

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- 11 It is a self-referential analysis of inside language existing relation between language itself vis-à-vis in the same language itself defined "reality". - Language express its own valid relation, connection to reality (2.06 , 2.12 , 4.023).
- 12 Independence as a necessary condition of correspondence theory to be consistent must stand further, when there is relation, connection between universal-language and reality, ! containing in the universal-language.
- 13 To d i s a g r e e with "both-and "possibilities"" would mean (only) either tautology or contradiction (4.46 , 4.464).
- 14 **Other** "true" proposition stands for "a positive fact" (2.06) that the sense of the first proposition ! **disagrees** (2.222 , 4.031). If there is no *other*, and ! necessary, "true" proposition, there would be ! "nothing" that ! exists in reality the first proposition's "sense" to disagree. - (A turing machine would not stop, halt. If could halt → ! contradiction.)
- 15 If one deals with the totality of well ordered propositions - as a logician shall - **all possible true and false propositions**, false substituted by true, ".. in logical space .. must already be given .." (1.13 , 4.023 , 4.06 , **3.42**). This is done in *Tractatus* since well ordered propositions of correspondence theory contain their ""both-and" possibilities".

a logician tries to access that "argument" of all "the possibilities"\* of both "truth" and "falsity" of .. the truth-arguments of propositions"\* (5.01). It is to say that the logic of correspondence theory itself makes the shield against the contradiction. - Indeed there exists ! .. a *logical impossibility*" (6.375) correspondence theory\* to be contradictory. It\* is consistent by itself, i. e. ! those ! o t h e r (contingent) "*true*" – must – exist – propositions .. cannot be said" (4.1212). So, no contradiction.

**# The valid language** of correspondence theory made in (universal-) language .. from within .." (4.114) applying correspondence theory in that language, independent of "reality" by the logic of correspondence theory itself, **is a model** (2.12), a simulation inside (universal-) language, how the relation between language and reality functions (completely) correct<sup>16</sup>. - And, in order to be that valid, **consistent** well ordered language\* (of correspondence theory) **which contains all its\* truth-possibilities**, tautological, contradictory and especially contingent (4.46 , 4.464) IT\* M U S T POINT OUT OF ITSELF\* TO THE INITIAL (UNIVERSAL-) LANGUAGE WHERE IT\* WAS MADE .. WHERE IN THE INITIAL (UNIVERSAL-) LANGUAGE ARE BY .. A LOGICAL NECESSITY .." (6.375) "TRUE" PROPOSITIONS "YET – TO – BE – MADE – AND – PROVED #. - Look at the appendix II.

Since these necessarily "true" propositions .. cannot be said" (2.18 , 4.06 , 4.12 , 4.121 , 4.1212 , 4.128), though the valid language of correspondence theory contains the possibility to express them as well (3.13)<sup>17</sup>, the valid language of correspondence theory made inside (universal-) language ! is not possible to be set out, access, or decipher ; to avoid opening "pandora box" of contradictions.

If the valid language of correspondence theory could be, will be possible, to decipher then it shows up as groups (4.46) of true propositions, which exclude each other ; in other words the propositions of these groups exclude each others, each others truth. - How could *all* each other excluded groups to be expressed? - This question might be in the midst of P vs. NP (question).

That the valid language of correspondence theory, made inside (universal-) language, cannot to be set out is the core of "the mystical" in *Tractatus*. That .. the world .. is" (6.44 , 6.45 , 6.522), by the necessarily "true" but "inexpressible" (4.1212 , 6.522) propositions, is "the mystical" of *Tractatus*. These have to be "true" but "inexpressible" propositions represent, stand for the reality of ontological realism. "The mystical" of *Tractatus* is not as much that .. a limit of the world .. the metaphysical subject" (5.632 + 5.641), but ! the inexhaustibility of "truths" contained in (universal-)language.

What's my conclusion.

16 A simulation vis-à-vis inside (universal-) language defined reality, by definition of correspondence theory itself.

17 In that sense .. A proposition .. does contain the possibility of expressing .. its sense" (3.13) that "A proposition is the expression of .. its .. truth-conditions .. contained in it" (3.13 + 4.4 + 3.318 + 4.431). If a valid proposition contains all its truth-possibilities, the provability of its both "truth" and "falsity", then ! basically it should be possible to express, set out meaning of the content. Nevertheless .. the possibility of expressing .. truth-conditions .. contained in .." (3.13 + 3.318 + 4.431) a valid proposition is closed since that "expression" necessitates that a valid proposition\* can be contained ! In itself\* ; which cannot be done without falling into ! contradiction. An i n v a l i d proposition, containing in itself, could compare itself with all its truth-possibilities, i.e. therefore to prove . . ! a l s o the possibilities of its both "truth" and "falsity". But as said, correspondence theory makes itself the shield against contradiction (3.333 , 3.333). - But did Wittgenstein see the shield / (4.5), meaning of ! (4.0312 , 4.128 , 6.4321) ?

**First**, that "the facts" by correspondence theory as a theory of (ontological) realism are alike jigsaw puzzle, made, and to be made, piece by piece applying scientific method (6.53) as it evolves.

**Second**, there is no "totality" of *all* valid propositions of correspondence theory, to be set out, inside (universal-) language, since that "totality" is ! broken, has ! no limit throughout pointing necessarily out of itself, back to (universal-) language<sup>18</sup>. Therefore the answer to (ask) the question of *all* valid propositions (of correspondence theory) demolish the question (6.5). - However, definitely (6.51), there are valid propositions of correspondence theory (4.064 , 4.0641\*) and hence -

**Thirdly**, the answer to a view that *Tractatus* would end to circular argument, is ! No. No since the proved fact that there already exist\* in (universal-) language "true" propositions "**to – be – made – and – proved**". It is\* the trick of correspondence theory to be consistent, and intertwines with that ".. pictures of the reality .. cannot be said .. in advance .. all at once .." (4.06 + 4.1212 + 5.47).<sup>19</sup>

## APPENDIX I

This has been a short summary of my view of *Tractatus*. Not even the essential paragraphs, as I call the sentences of the *book*, are with. One of the main things is the fact that the well ordered propositions of correspondence theory, ".. pictures of the reality" (2.06), **contain** the possibility of (provability of) their **both "truth" and "falsity"**. This ""both-and" possibility" can be read clearly by comparing only (2.06 , 2.11\* , 2.203\* , 3.02\* , 4.2 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 5.01). I put these paragraphs, also paragraphs (2.201 , 2.202 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.21 , 4.431 , 5), here with some underlines, boldings, spaces and comments of my own. Another essential of *Tractatus* is how the possibility of (provability of) **both "truth" and "falsity"** of propositions realises ! (4.0641). This "essential", what is said in paragraphs (3.332 , 3.333) and paragraphs (4.064 , 4.0641), weaves<sup>20</sup>. - (Look at appendix III.)

"The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality. (We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative fact.)". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

Expressions "states of affairs" and "atomic facts" are synonyms, mean the same.

Note that "reality" is conceived applying ! correspondence theory itself in language. It is possible without (falling into) circular argument because of that definition is made in language\* - ".. what exists independently of what is the case" (1.1 , 1.12 , 2.021 , 2.0211 , 2.0212 , 2.024 , 2.06 , 2.063 , 3.203 , 3.3 , 4.061), i. e. "**reality**" - where\* is not yet made (2.1) any proposition that can assert its truth value ! provably. Correspondence theory's validity, i. e. that correspondence theory drifts not

18 What about ".. a limit of the world .. the metaphysical subject" (5.632 + 5.641)? Is the existence of "it" one of the necessary but "inexpressible "truths"" (6.522) of (universal-)language. Or is there no ".. limit of the world" either since there is no limit of the (universal)language, i. e. no limit what in (universal-)language can be said ; except to ! decipher that "what in (universal-)language can be said". No "limit" since ! ".. we cannot .. say what we can not think" (5.61). There's no "limit" that can be drawn to ".. what can be thought .." (Preface, (4 , 4.06 , 4.112 , 4.114)). Consistently a ".. riddle does not exist .." (6.5) if "it" is proved to be (such that) not ".. possible to answer .." (6.5).

19 *Tractatus* would end to circular argument if there could not be any valid propositions of correspondence theory.

20 The point of 4.0641, ".. a logical place other ..", can be seen as a corollary of paragraphs (3.332 , 3.333). To deny the truth of well ordered propositions presupposes other true propositions with ".. different meanings .." (3.333).

to circular argument or contradiction, presupposes its\* language to be in the first place, fortwith independent of reality. This, "independence of reality", makes it possible to conceive "reality" using, applying correspondence theory itself in language (because of there is in language not ! yet a single well ordered proposition that can assert its provable truth value). Thus, ".. the existence .. of atomic facts" (2.06 , 2.11) means by definition of the correspondence theory that "the sense" of a proposition agrees with reality, and ".. the .. non-existence of atomic facts" (2.06 , 2.11) means that "the sense" of a proposition disagrees with reality (2.221 , 2.222 , 4.031 , 4.0311).

Wittgenstein defines "world" as all the true positive propositions and all the false positive, i. e. true negative\*, propositions ; according the definition of correspondence theory of "truth" (1.11 , 2.06 , 2.063). - A negative proposition is with negative sign " $\neg p$ ", like "Finland is not an island"\*.

"The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and non-existence of atomic facts". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

"In logical space" of correspondence theory\* ; by applying it\* in universal-language (1.13). These, **universal-language** and **correspondence theory** of "truth", are the components of Wittgenstein's "substance of the world"-doctrine<sup>21</sup>. - **They are the means of my interpretation of *Tractatus***.

"The picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

"The picture represents **a possible state of affairs in logical space**". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

".. **a possible state of affairs in logical space**" (2.202) is indeed, quite obviously ".. **a possibility of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts**" ((2.11 , 2.201)  $\rightarrow$  4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 5 , 5.01).

"The picture **contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it represents**". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01, italics is mine.)

"The thought **contains the possibility** of the state of affairs which it thinks. What is thinkable is also possible". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

"I conceive the proposition – like Frege and Russell – as a function of the expressions contained in it". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

A well formed proposition of correspondence theory, ".. a picture of reality .. contains the possibility of .. the existence and non-existence of atomic facts .. the truth-arguments of propositions" (2.06 + 2.11 + 2.201 + 2.203 + 3.318 + 4.01 + 4.2 + 4.25 + 4.41 + 4.431 + 5 + 5.01, italics is mine).

<sup>21</sup> (2.021 , 2.0211 , 2.0212 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.23 , 3.3 , 4.2\* , 4.21 , 4.23 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 5.01). Only in the context of "pictures of the reality" (4.06) names have a proof-theoretical\* meaning, representing "**the truth-possibilities**".

"The proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01, you feel free to look paragraph 2.12.)

"Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

"The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2\*, 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431\*<sup>22</sup> , 5 , 5.01, italics is mine.)

This, above said paragraph is essential! It cannot be overlooked. It says **what it means a proposition**, that ".. already .. represents such and such state of affairs" (2.021 , 2.0211 , 2.0212 , 3.203 , 3.3 , 4.031 , 4.0311 , 4.064 , 4.2211), **to be** ".. a picture of reality .." (4.01 , 4.06), a well ordered proposition. - Anyway, what paragraph (4.2) says not, is the ! **crucial thing** of "containing". **It is that** ".. the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts" (4.2) **are contained** in a well formed proposition of correspondence theory ! It self. "The sense of a proposition .." (4.2) is **the definition** of the well formed proposition of correspondence theory. **So, to ! represent** ".. the logic of the facts .. pictures of the reality" (2.06 , 4.0312 + 4.06) **all** those propositions that have ".. agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts" (4.2) **have to be said**. **Yet to express** "those propositions", to fulfill Wittgenstein's aim, is **not possible anymore precisely because** ".. the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts" (4.2) **are already contained** in a well formed proposition (3.332 , 3.333). **If a well ordered proposition could** ".. contain itself" (3.333) **in order to be able to say what have to be said, then contradiction**. But the law of identity would be broken as well (in case of a well ordered proposition could ".. contain itself" (3.333)). The well formed proposition\* and the proposition contained in it\* cannot be the same! - They\*\* ".. must have different meanings .."<sup>23</sup> [(3.332 , 3.333) → 4.0641 → (5.55 , 5.5571) → Z].

"The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

"If the elementary proposition is true, the atomic fact exist ; if it is false the atomic fact does not exist". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

"The truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions mean the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of the atomic facts". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01 , underline continues (4.41))

"The truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions are the conditions of the truth and falsehood of the propositions". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

22 As we can soon see by another ! essential paragraph ".. the truth-conditions of the proposition .." (4.431) is a synonym to "the sense of a proposition" (4.2).

23 Thus as such by the law of identity also the law of contradiction holds; consistency of correspondence theory holds.



"The expression of the agreement and disagreement **with the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions** expresses the truth-conditions of the proposition. The proposition is the *expression of its truth-conditions*". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318\* , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2\* , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , **4.431\*** , 5 , 5.01, italics is mine.)

"The truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions .. are the conditions of the truth **and** falsehood of the propositions" (4.3 + 4.41 , 5.01).

"Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself)". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

"The elementary propositions are the truth-arguments of propositions". (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

A well formed proposition of correspondence theory as ".. a picture of reality .. **contains the .. possibilities of .. the truth **and** falsehood of .. the truth-arguments of .. its own** (2.203 + 4.01 + 4.3 + 4.41 + 5.01).

If I add, compound here yet the already said paragraph 4.06 -

"Propositions can be true or false only by being pictures of the reality". (2.06 , 4.06)

we can put in the place of "being pictures of the reality" following -

"Propositions can be true or false only by .. **containing the possibilities of .. the truth **and** falsehood of .. the truth-arguments of .. their own** (2.203 , 4.06 , 4.3 , 4.41 + 5.01, italics is mine).

Therefore, ".. the expression of **agreement and disagreement** with the truth-possibilities of .. the truth-arguments of propositions .. **cannot be said .. because** the propositional sign **already contains** the prototype of its own argument and it cannot contain itself" (3.333 + 4.1212 + 4.4<sup>24</sup> + 5.01), anymore.

To wit, it is precisely ! ".. **the truth-possibilities of .. the truth-arguments of propositions**" (4.4 + 5.01) of their own, **provability of ! both "truth" ! and "falsity"** of well ordered propositions (of their own), **that are contained in "**.. **the propositional sign ..**" (3.333).

Thus, if a well-ordered proposition could ".. contain itself" (3.333) that would mean in the case of "agreement" (4.2 , 4.4) a contradiction, and "well-orderness" would turn to invalidity.

Anyway it is ".. a logical impossibility" (6.375) to get a well ordered proposition of correspondence theory to ".. contain itself" (3.333) since it would lead to that the well ordered proposition\* (in case) inevitably .. determines a logical place **other .. outside ..** ((3.332 , 3.333) → **4.0641**) itself\*.


We can conclude that correspondence theory shows its own consistency by that ".. the logic of / the well ordered propositions that can be proved true or false / cannot be represented" (4.0312).

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24 This paragraph is not only a clear definition of well ordered propositions of correspondence theory but also says what is needed to express them. I put it here, though better place would have been in main text.

"A proposition is the expression of agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions". (4.06 , 4.2 , 4.4 , 4.431) That, "the expression" is ! "the inexpressible" (3.332 , 3.333 , 4.1212 , 6.522).

## APPENDIX II



The Circle(s) above demonstrate how the valid, well ordered, language BA of the correspondence theory (2.221 , 2.222 , 2.223 , 4.031 , 4.0311 , 4.01 , 4.06) is done in (universal-) language CA<sup>25</sup> by applying correspondence theory in CA. - Look at the first whole # chapter # of page 5 to see how the BA\* is done, and how IT\* is, by applying correspondence theory in (universal-) language.

The valid, well ordered, language BA of the correspondence theory, made in (universal-) language CA - vis-à-vis, self-referential, in the same (universal-) language defined "reality"<sup>26</sup> - consist of the well formed propositions that contain the possibility of (provability of) their both "truth" and "falsity" (2.06 , 2.1 , 2.11\* , 2.201 , 2.202 , **2.203\*** , **3.02\*** , 4.06 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.25 , 4.431 , 5.01).

Anyway, in the respect of Wittgenstein's aim (Preface, (4.112 , 4.114)), the well formed propositions of BA cannot constitute the totality of "thoughts" / "the pictures of reality", i. e. the well ordered propositions that can be proved true or false (1.13 , 2.06 , 2.063 , 2.1 , 2.141 , 3 , 3.12 , 3.14 , 4 , 4.001 , 4.01 , 4.06 , 4.1 , 4.25 , 5 , 5.01).

**To ! a g r e e with the possibility of its\* (provability of) both "truth" and "falsity" a ! contingent proposition\* (4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 5.01) points out of itself\* → CB , TO AN ! O T H E R PROPOSITION THAT IS NECESSARILY "TRUE" ((3.332 , 3.333) → 4.0641) , in order to make the "falsity" of the first, initial, proposition\* possible, ".. i t s sense"\* (2.221 , 4.031 , 4.0311) to d i s a g r e e (2.222) s o m e (thing) existing, t r u e (positive) f a c t of the world, reality.**

25 "Tosi" is in English "true", and "epätosi" is "false". (Accidentally in Finnish.)

26 This in (universal-) language defined "reality" represents the outside, independent of language, existing reality\*; to which\* the necessary relation, connection must be made i n (universal-) language i t s e l f, vis-à-vis in the same language defined "reality". - "Reality" must be defined to grasp what "pictures of the reality" (2.06 , 4.06) are.

Wittgenstein's aim fails, so  $\Rightarrow$  (7).

The necessarily "true" *other* propositions\* ".. cannot be said" (2.18 , 2.21 , **4.0312** , 4.12 , **4.1212** , **4.128** , **6.4321**). They\* stand for reality as it is by ontological realism (6.44 , 6.552).

Finally, what is left, is **valid CA** where provably exists well formed propositions to be done.

### APPENDIX III

"No proposition can say anything about itself, because the propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (that is the "whole theory of types")". (3.332, italics is mine. Underline runs below (3.333).)

"A function cannot be its own argument, because the functional sign already contains the prototype of its own argument and it cannot contain itself.

If, for example, we suppose that the function  $F(x)$  could be its own argument, then there would be a proposition " $F(F(x))$ ", and in this the outer function  $F$  and the inner function  $F$  must have *different meanings*; for the inner has the form  $\varphi(x)$ , the outer the form  $\psi(\varphi(x))$ . Common to both functions is only the letter "F", which by itself signifies nothing. .." (3.333, italics is mine.)

"No proposition can say anything about itself, because .. A function .. already contains the prototype of its own argument and it cannot contain itself .." (3.332 + 3.333) ! any more; in order to be consistent. - Clearly, what .. A function .. already contains .. says "NO" to "contain itself".

What is that .. A function .. already contains the prototype of its own argument .. (3.333) ?

What is that .. A function .. already contains .. (3.333) ?

What is .. the prototype of its own argument .. (3.333) ? - Clearly it is .. the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts" (2.06 , 2.201 , 4.1 , **4.2**), and still reading we get -

.. the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions .. truth-arguments of propositions"  
(4.3 , 4.4 , 4.41 , 4.431) + 5.01

.. the truth-possibilities of .. ! both "truth" ! and "falsity" of .. .. the truth-arguments of propositions" (4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

So, what is that .. A function .. already contains .. (3.333) ? It is exactly abovesaid -

.. the truth-possibilities of .. ! both "truth" ! and "falsity" of .. .. the truth-arguments of propositions" (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , **2.203** , **3.02** , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

Thus, finally, what "No proposition can say .. about itself .." (3.332) ?

It is "**the sense .. about itself**"\* (3.332 , 4.2) what cannot be said. To say "it"\* , a well ordered proposition to say " .. its agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts" (4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01) , would presuppose a well ordered proposition to " .. contain itself .." (3.333). Else it's not possible a well ordered proposition to compare itself with that it " .. already contains .." (3.333). Yet, to " .. contain itself .." (3.333) , to compare and say "the sense .. about itself .." (3.332 , 4.2) can't be done. There are two reasons. **First** , " .. the outer function F and the inner function F must have different meanings .." (3.333, italics is mine.) ; " .. F and .. F .." cannot equal. - By (3.332 , 3.333) the law of identity holds true. As a laymen's example maybe such "gedanken-experiment" of a situation " .. that the function F(x) could be its own argument .." (3.333) that would it be possible a definite circle to contain itself so that both circles, the outer and the inner, could be the same (circle), have the same value, meaning of pi? - I think, definitely not. - Lines, circles C and B / look appendix II cannot be equal. The law of identity is true due to the fact that a proposition\* " .. contained in itself .." (3.332) **inevitably** " .. determines a logical place other than .. the proposition .." (4.0641) it\* should to , ! as a same proposition, be contained in [(3.332 , 3.333) → 4.0641) → 5.55]. It is to say that the " .. logical place other .. lies outside .." (3.333 , 4.0641) that a proposition in which ! "i t" should ! as ! a same proposition to be " .. contained in .." (3.332). - To " .. contain itself .."\* (3.333 → 4.2) cannot be done. - "It"\* contradicts the law of identity (and would lead as a corollary to contradiction). And if, when asked what is "a logical place other" the answer is : "It" is an an other, possible well ordered, proposition (3.4 , 3.41 , 3.411 , 4.0641), with " .. different meanings .." (3.333). **Second reason** is (more) in the line of my interpretation of *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein's "fundamental thought" (4.0312 , 4.128 , 6.4321). Second reason is (straight) truth- and proof-theoretical. It is the question of correspondence theory to be consistent. - In the meaning to be non-contradictory. It is a clear fact, in my reading of *Tractatus*, that \*the well ordered propositions\* of correspondence theory, " .. pictures of the reality" (4.06) , contain the possibility (of provability) of their ! **both** "truth" ! **and** "falsity" -

" .. the truth-possibilities of .. ! **both** "truth" ! **and** "falsity" of .. " .. the truth-arguments of propositions" (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01) ; that is to say of \*t h e i r\* own.

This amazing ""both-and" possibility" of a proposition is consistent(ly) possible if and only if "falsity" is replaced, substituted by an other proposition, "t r u e" proposition. To deny the "truth" of a proposition, to ! assert the "falsity" of a proposition, presuppose that there exist ! "an other ! "true" proposition which substitutes the "falsity" of the other first proposition ; makes its "falsehood" possible. (Look at the footnote 14.) To deny, denying the "truth" of a proposition -

" .. determines a logical place other .. outside .. the denied proposition .." (3.4 , 3.41 , 3.411 , 3.4 , 4.064 , 4.0641).

"Every proposition must already have a sense; assertion cannot give it a sense, for what it asserts is the sense itself. And the same holds of denial, etc". (2.021 , 3.203 , 3.3 , 4.031 , 4.064 , 4.2211)

If a proposition not " .. already have a sense .. meaning .. of the constituent parts .. in the context of a proposition .." (2.021 , 2.0211 , 2.0212\* , 3.203 + 3.3 + 3.4 + 4.064 , 4.2211), there's nothing\* to assert. This is the central part of the pure language side of Wittgenstein's "substance of the world"-doctrine. But paragraph 4.064 means also in the context correspondence theory. The gist of "a sense" is as well ! what a proposition "already contains"\* (2.203 ← 3.333), and must have also "it"\*.

A proposition, not until, as ”.. a picture of reality .. **asserts** .. **the agreement or disagreement of its sense** .. such and such a state of affairs .. **with reality** ..” (2.17 , 2.18 , 2.21 , 2.22 , 2.221 , 2.222 + 4.01 + 4.031 + 4.064, italics is mine.)

As said **the premise that well ordered**, provably true or false **propositions** of **correspondence theory must be** ”.. **pictures of the reality**” (2.06 , 4.06 , 4.1 , 4.25 , 5 , 5.01) **is the ! necessary condition** of correspondence theory to be consistent, i. e. **independence** of (universal-) language with respect to, vis à vis, **reality**.

”Substance is what exists **independently** of what is the case”. (1\* , 1.1 , 1.11 , 1.12\* , 1.13 , 2.021 , 2.0211 , 2.0212 , **2.024\*** , 2.06 , 2.063 , 3.203 , 3.3 , **4.061** , 4.064, italics is mine.)

But not until paragraph 4.061 -

”If one does *not* observe that propositions have a sense **independent** of the facts, one can easily believe that true and false are two relations between signs and things with equal rights.

One could then, for example, **say that ”p” signifies in the true way what ”¬ p” signifies in the false way**, etc.”. (1\* , 1.1 , 1.11 , 1.12 , 1.13 , 2.021 , 2.0211 , 2.0212 , **2.024** , 2.06 , 2.063 , 3.203 , 3.3 , 4.061 , 4.064, italics is mine.)

says the **core** of ”independence”. It is the fact that to be consistent correspondence theory **presuppose** ”.. **that propositions have a sense independent of the facts** ..” (4.061)<sup>27</sup>. Else, if not ”independence” then ”.. **”p” signifies in the true way what ”¬ p” signifies in the false way**, etc.” (4.061), which is (in my book) a contradiction.

Yet independence **alone** means that the ”.. sense .. such and such a state of affairs” (2.222 + 4.031 , 4.0311), which a proposition **”already**” (4.064) has, cannot be compared with reality (2.223), i. e. to prove truth or falsity of a proposition (in case). Although a proposition must ”.. **already** have a **sense** ..” (4.064) it is not in touch, in conjunction with reality<sup>28</sup>, to compare. - Thus independence seems to lead nothing, but a ! broken, invalid correspondence theory.

So a relation, connection between (universal-) language and reality must be possible, to save correspondence theory. Since the independence of (universal-) language with respect to reality is **external**, between (universal-) language and reality, **the necessary relation**, connection, **have to be** .. **internal**. And there is no other place to that ”must be”-relation than inside (universal-) language\* itself, vis à vis ! In it\* as well **defined** (concept of) **”reality”**.

Reality has to be conceived, not only especially (a logician) to be able to express, set out ”relation to ! ”what”” or ”pictures of ! ”what””, but also because of ”reality” is a concept of correspondence theory. As already argued, look at the last chapter of page 2, first chapter of page 3 and last chapter in page 6 continued in page 7, reality can be defined (without falling into circular argument) using correspondence theory itself, which means that ”.. **pictures of the reality**” (2.06 , 4.06) are -

**inside** (universal)- language made ”pictures of the ”truth and falsehood of propositions””.

And in order these ”pictures of the ”truth and falsehood of propositions”” to be well ordered, there must be **inside** ”pictures” **relation** to ”their” truth-values, **which** is that ”they” -

**contain** the possibility of the provability of their **both** ”truth” **and** ”falsehood” (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.318 , 4.01 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)<sup>29</sup>

27 Logically, ”.. independent of facts ..” **as reality is defined in universal-language by ! correspondence theory itself**.

28 That’s why ”A proposition must communicate a **new sense** with old words .. it **must be essentially** connected with **the state of affairs** .. it is **its** logical picture ..” (2.06 , 2.1 , 4.03). The ”**new sense**” is that of **truth- and proof-theoretical** / (4.2), **which** means, a proposition **contains** the possibility (of provability) of both its ”truth” and ”falsity”.

29 To contain possibilities of **both** ”truth” **and** ”falsehood” because of **contingent** propositions must have, **presuppose** ””**both-and**” **possibilities**”, in order to be able to be ”either-or”. - (Also since it’s a question of ! all truth-values.)

And that "containing", consequently part of well formed proposition, is consistent iff -

"One could say, the denial is already related to the logical place determined by the proposition that is denied.

The denying proposition determines a logical place **other** than does the proposition denied.

The denying proposition determines a logical place, *with the help of the logical place of the proposition denied, by saying that it lies **o u t s i d e** the latter place.*

That one can deny again the denied proposition, shows that what is denied is already a proposition and not merely the preliminary to a proposition". (4.064 , 4.0641, italics is mine, except "**other**".)

".. The denying proposition determines a logical place **o t h e r** than does the proposition denied .. with the help of the logical place of the proposition denied, by saying that it lies **o u t s i d e the .. denied proposition ..**" (4.064 , 4.0641)

To "deny a proposition"? It is the truth of a proposition that is denied, i. e. " .. the agreement .. of its sense with reality .." (2.222 , 4.031) is denied.

For example proposition "Finland is not an island" is denying the truth of (denied proposition) "Finland is an island". - (To deny "the sense" itself is not possible, it's not possible to deny what already is said. E.g. if "Finland is an Island" denies "itself", denying is a kind of ! contradiction (4.062)).

- - -

But how do paragraphs (3.332 , 3.333) and paragraphs (4.064 , 4.0641) weave, intertwine? How are they combined to say the same thing, the point of **what** -

"No proposition can say .. about itself .." (3.332 ) ?

which is the (logical) fact of Wittgenstein's "fundamental thought" (4.0312 , 4.128 , 6.4321) that it is not possible to say -

".. the conditions of the truth **and** falsehood of the propositions" (2.06 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 5 . 5.01).

What matters, link between paragraphs (3.332 , 3.333 , 4.064 , 4.0641), is the fact that every truth- and proof-theoretically valid, well ordered, proposition of correspondence theory necessarily " .. a l r e a d y **contains** the prototype of its own argument .." (3.333), which is (the same as) to say that every truth- and proof-theoretically valid, well formed, proposition of correspondence theory necessarily -

".. already **contains** .. the conditions of the truth **and** falsehood of .." (3.333 + 4.41) of its own.

And to say " .. the conditions of the truth **and** falsehood of the propositions" (2.06 . 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 5 . 5.01), i.e. to express "the sense" (4.2 , 4.4 , 4.431) of a well ordered proposition would presuppose a well ordered proposition to " .. be contained in itself" (3.332), which is not possible *since a proposition\* " .. contained in itself" (3.332) and the proposition in it ! i t\* is contained cannot equal* -

".. the outer function *F* and the inner function *F* must have **different meanings** .." (3.333, italics is mine.).

So, what paragraphs (3.332 , 3.333) say, i. e. " .. the outer function *F* and the inner function *F* must have **different meanings** .." (3.333), says the same thing (than) that in order to be well ordered con-

tingent proposition of correspondence theory, to (be able to) deny truth of a proposition, a well formed proposition -

”.. determines a logical place **other** .. o u t s i d e .. the denied proposition ..” (4.064 , 4.0641).

As said, ”.. a logical place *other* ..” is *an other*, possible well formed *proposition*\* (3.4 , 3.41 , 3.411 , 4.0641). And *it's*\* *truth* has to be possible (6.375) because of *it*\* *represents that* ”**fact**” **of reality**, *which the* ”sense” (4.031) *of* ”.. the denied proposition ..” (4.0641) ! **d i s a g r e e s** (2.222).

Key to understand how paragraphs (3.332 , 3.333) and paragraphs (4.064 , 4.0641) intertwine is *the logical fact* that : ”A function .. *already contains the prototype of its own argument* ..”\* (3.333). **It** means that *a well formed proposition* (3.318) in case *inevitably shows ! \**”.. a logical place other .. outside ..” (4.064 , 4.0641) *of itself*\*. \*That\* (4.0641) *p r e v e n t s* ”.. a picture of reality ..” (4.01) to contain itself, so that not to end up in contradiction. - **If** a well ordered proposition, ”.. a picture of reality .. **could** be its own argument .. **be contained in itself**” (3.332 + 3.333 + 4.01)  $\rightarrow$

*it*\* **could** express ”.. the conditions of the truth **and** falsehood of ..” (4.2 , 4.4 , **4.41** , 4.431) *its*\* own, i. e. to **say** the possibilities of **both** *its*\* ”truth” **and** ”falsehood”.

It is not that much ”gedanken-experiment” (page 12 ) that is the barrier, but that it is not allowed a well ordered proposition to ”.. be contained in itself” (3.332), and express its ””**both-and**” possibilities”, i. e. ”.. conditions of the truth **and** falsehood ..” (4.41) ; in the name of non-contradiction.

**B u t, if** and when ”.. a picture of reality .. *already contains* ..” (2.203 , 4.01 + 3.333) -

”.. the possibilities of .. the truth **and** falsehood of .. the truth-arguments of propositions”, that is, of ”**its**” **o w n** (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 5.01)

it seems to be anyway so that ”.. the agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of the .. truth-arguments of propositions” (4.431 + 5.01) of their own is inevitable to well ordered propositions of correspondence theory precisely because of that ”containing”<sup>30</sup> even if that ”.. agreement and disagreement .. *cannot* be said” (4.431 + 4.1212 , 6.522). - And if so, then yet contradiction ; **built-in** contradiction.

**But** anyway, if / when the law of contradiction is a premise<sup>31</sup> of the logic of correspondence theory, there can not be contradiction. To wit, when ”.. pictures of the reality”\* (4.06) **a g r e e** ”.. with the possibilities of .. the truth **and** falsehood of .. the truth-arguments of propositions”, i.e. of ”t h e i r”\* **own** (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 5.01) -

**to a g r e e** ”.. with the .. possibilities of the .. falsehood of .. the truth-arguments of propositions”, that is, of ”t h e i r”\* **own** (2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 4.06\* , 4.25 , 4.3 , **4.4 + 4.41 + 5.01**)

is non-contradictory possible by the fact that

”.. a picture of reality .. determines a logical place **other** .. o u t s i d e .. the denied proposition ..” (4.01 , 3.4 , 3.41 , 3.411 , 3.4 , 4.064 , 4.0641).

which means that (already said above)

30 In principle it might be so that ”.. a picture of reality ..” (4.01) *realises, proves* automatically, what ”*it*” **contains**, i. e. ”*it*” proves (automatically) ”.. its agreement and disagreement with ..” (3.13 , 4.01 , 4.2 , 4.5) that ”*it*” contains.

31 As a premise  $\approx$  an axiom, the law of contradiction can't be proved, i. e.  $\approx$  Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.

“.. a picture of reality .. **determines** a logical place *other* .. outside ..” OF “ITSELF” (4.01 + 4.0641), **shows another well ordered proposition\* with** “.. **different meanings** .. outside ..” OF “ITSELF” (3.333 + 4.0641), **whose\* “truth” makes the “falsity” in case possible.**

An other well ordered proposition is nothing else but an other “picture of reality” (4.01). Therefore well formed propositions of correspondence theory as “.. pictures of the reality” (4.06) constitute a totality of interrelated propositions (3.42)<sup>32</sup>, which makes their “truth” and “falsehood” possible. If that “totality”, all “.. pictures of the reality .. logical forms ..” (4.06 + 4.128) could be said, there would be no(t straight) contradictory<sup>33</sup> propositions, but propositions whose “truths” exclude each others “truths”. Groups of propositions whose “truths” exclude each others “truths” (4.46 , 4.464), and make the “falsity” of the propositions of other groups possible. - Hence →

“What *can* be shown .. the logical form of reality .. *cannot* be said” (2.16 , 2.161 , 2.17 , 2.18 , 2.21 , 2.22 , 2.221 , 2.222 , 4.031 , 4.0311 , 4.064 , 4.0641 , **4.121** + **4.1212** , **4.128** , 4.2 , 6.522)

It’s not, even in principle, possible to deduce totality of “objects”, whatever “they” are, which constitute groups that exclude each other.

Yet, if try to do “deducing” it would presuppose first to say, i. e. determinate in its entirety what are the “sub-objects” that constitute groups that then exclude each others.

In the case of *Tractatus* / its aim / “picture theory”, those “sub-objects” are all propositions that can be proved true or false (in a consistent way by some truth-theory).

But there are not yet any proposition that can be proved true or false ← Russell’s paradox. Therefore “sub-objects” are as well all the grammatically correct propositions that can be done in universal-language (where “everything” can in principle be said, expressed) by their constituent parts, by their elements like names\* or words\* with meanings in their\* propositional context<sup>34</sup>. The totality of these propositions can be in principle done, by some algorithm applied to universal-language.

After that is the question, challenge to divide the totality of the grammatically correct propositions to those groups which exclude each other, one proposition at a time with respect, vis-à-vis, to ! every other proposition. - This challenge would be as such a ! huge algorithmic task<sup>35</sup>.

Still, ! how to do this task to divide? There must be some method. *This method must be in the case of Tractatus with respect to Wittgenstein’s aim* (Preface / (3 , 4 , 4.06 , 4.112 , 4.114)). Therefore the method would be that of applying correspondence theory to all grammatically correct propositions of universal-language, at a time ! vis-à-vis to ! every other proposition. So all grammatically and by correspondence theory correct propositions must at once “.. be given .. in logical space ..” ((1.13 + 3.42) → 4.06) of that - not by accident\* - supposed, postulated truth-theory (2.21 , 2.221 , 2.222 , 2.223 , 4.031 , 4.0311), which has to be proved consistent\*, when applied in universal-language.

32 3.42 → *Tractatus*’s mysticism: The totality of well ordered propositions of correspondence theory (4.06) contained in universal-language represent “.. the world .. as a .. whole..” (6.44 + 6.45) .. *since the dawn of time and . . . . !*

33 Not (straight) contradictory since these valid propositions of the correspondence theory ! circumvent contradiction.

34 **The “objects”**, names, words with their meanings in propositional context, **that ! form “the substance” of the well ordered propositions** (1.1 , 1.13 , **2.021** , **2.06** , 2.063 , **2.1** , 2.141 , 3.12 + 3.14 , **3.203** , **3.3** , **4.06** , 4.064 , 4.2211) ! **exists already**. **So** → “Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs” (**2.014** , 2.06 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , **2.203** , **4.1** , **4.25** , **4.3** , **4.41** , **5.01**). “Objects” make propositions, their “sense”\* (3.3), be “it\*” proof-theoretical or not yet, but so far only a “sense” of the grammatically correct propositions (2.0124). That, “objects” make (already grammatically) correct proposition’s “sense” (3.3), is why “objects” **are logical subjects of “containing”**.

35 Even with super-computers. It will be a question to deal with ! All ! Possible ! Propositions of (general) Universal-Language ! one by one, at a time, and .. ! one fell swoop. - It is, will be a challenge of quantum computers.



**But already** in the logic of correspondence theory **is built-in** that there are groups of "true" propositions which *exclude* each others "truths", and make the "falsity" of the propositions of other groups possible. **So**, it would be a circular argument if trying to circumvent (as said above) the fact -

"The logical forms .. of reality .. are *anumerical* .. indeed .. *inexpressible*.." (2.16 , 2.161 , 2.17 , 2.18 , **4.0312** , 4.12 , **4.121** , 4.1212 , **4.128** , **6.4321** , **6.552**)

"We now have to answer a priori the question about all the possible forms of elementary propositions.

The elementary proposition consists of names. Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with **different meanings**, we are also unable to give the composition of elementary propositions". (5.01 , 5.55 , 5.5571 italics is mine. Underline runs below (5.5571).)

"If I cannot give elementary propositions a priori then it must lead to obvious nonsense to try to give them". (5.01 , 5.55 , 5.5571)

No doubt, **if** ".. we are .. unable to give the **composition of** .. elementary propositions .. **truth-arguments of propositions** .. *a priori* .." (5.01 + 5.55 + 5.5571, italics is mine.) then also ".. we are .. unable to give the composition of .. the totality of propositions .." (4.001 + 5.55) that are well ordered, provable true or false propositions, i. e. ".. pictures of the reality" (4.06). - Ergo → Wittgenstein's aim (Preface / (4.112 , 4.114)) fails → 7.

The key of these two paragraphs (5.55 , 5.5571) is -

".. we are unable to give the *number of names with different meanings* .." (5.55 , 5.5571)

because of it, the key, is in the midst of Wittgenstein's "substance of the world"-doctrine (1\* , 1.1 , 1.11 , 1.12 , 1.13 , 2 , 2.06 , 2.063 , **2.021** , 2.0211 , 2.0212 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.22 , 3.23\* , 3.3 , 4.2\* , 4.23 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 5 , 5.01)<sup>36</sup>.

"**Objects** form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot be compound". (1.13 , 2.021)

The underlined first sentence of paragraph 2.021 is relevant. Relevant is Wittgenstein's "substance of the world"-doctrine in the context of correspondence theory<sup>37</sup>. "The world" is composed of *\*all the well ordered, provable true or false propositions\** that are formed, when *correspondence theory* is applied, by its *logic, to universal-language*, the other concern of "substance of the world"-doctrine. \*That\* is the significance of paragraph 1.13.

"The facts in **logical space** are the world". (1.1 , 1.11 , 1.12 , **1.13** , 2.06 , 2.063 , 2.1 , 2.141 , 3.12 + 3.14 , 4.06) ← **2.21** , **2.222** , 4.031 , 4.0311, italics is mine.)

36 Yet in paragraphs 3.221 and 4.1272 Wittgenstein says the same thing than in paragraphs 5.55 and 5.5571. He says in his native language: "Die Gegenstände kann ich nur nennen .. sie aussprechen kan ich nicht .. es ist unsinnig, von der Anzahl aller Gegenstände zu sprechen .." (3.221 + 4.1272, spaces original.). The thing what ".. cannot put .. into words .." (3.221 , 4.1212 , 6.522) is **\*all** ".. the truth-possibilities of .. the truth-arguments of propositions"\* (2.021 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.221 , 3.23 , 3.3 , 4.2 , 4.23 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.4 , 4.431 , (**4.41** + **5.01**)), **and ! since** **\*they\*** **are composed, as well expressions** ".. of names with *different meanings*" (5.55) **! either** ".. the number of names with *different meanings* .. cannot be said" (4.1212 + 5.55 , 5.5571 , 6.522). - This also in next page.

37 Yet, if **not** the other (and first) concern of "substance of the world"-doctrine, the universal-language and its propositions that ".. *already* have a sense .." (2.021 , 2.0211 , 2.0212 , 3.203 , 3.3 , **4.064** ) , there would be no basis to apply correspondence theory\*, which *neccissitates* universal-language to be independent of reality (1\* , 1.1 , 1.12 , **2.024** , 2.06 , 2.063 , **4.061**). - Universal-language independent of reality makes to define reality, ! by truth-theory\* itself.

"The logical space" is that of correspondence theory's "logical space", and "the world / "the facts" are ".. pictures of the reality" (2.06 , 2.063 , 2.1 , 2.141 , 3.12 + 3.14 , 4.01 , **4.06**) as provable true or false propositions (4.1 , 4.25 , 5 , 5.01).

Therefore, that what matters in the context of paragraph (2.021) is "provable true or false propositions", that is -

**"Objects form the substance of the world. .."** (2.021, italics is mine.)

as all the well ordered, **provable true** or false propositions of correspondence theory. - But, **what** are these "objects" ?

"The simple signs employed in proposition are called names". (2.021 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.22 , 3.23 , 3.3 , 4.23)

"The name means the object. The object is its meaning. ("A" is the same sign as "A")". (2.021 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.22 , 3.23 , 3.3 , 4.23, italics is mine.)

"In the proposition the name represents the object". (2.021 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.22 , 3.23 , 3.3 , 4.23)

"The postulate of the possibility of the simple signs is the postulate of the determinateness of the sense". (2.021 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.22 , 3.23 , 3.3 , 4.2 , 4.23, italics is mine.)

The "determinateness of the sense"\* will be read in the context of paragraph 4.2, and (at least in my book) "it\* is to show **the totality of** .. **the truth-possibilities** of .. the truth-arguments of propositions" (2.021 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.221 , 3.23 , 3.3 , 4.2 , 4.23 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.4 , 4.431 , (**4.41** + **5.01**)).

"Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning". (2.021 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.22 , 3.23 , 3.3 , 4.23)

I don't put here paragraphs 3.31 , 3.311 and (again) paragraph 3.318. Yet it is worth of looking at them in the context of some other paragraphs. - If you carefully compare paragraphs (3.3 , 3.31 , 3.311) with paragraphs (3.202 , 3.203 , 3.23 , 3.318 , 4.2 , 4.23 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 5.01), you can realise that ".. An expression .. presupposes the forms of all propositions in which it can occur .." (3.3 , 3.31 + 3.311) **since** ! "objects" (3.203 , 3.3 , 4.23) **are expressions** of "the truth-possibilities" (4.3 , 4.41), **both** "truth" **and** "falsehood", of ".. the elementary propositions .. the truth-arguments of propositions" (4.23 + 5.01), and **thus** ! **a s expressions of those "truth-possibilities" presuppose ! all** ".. the elementary propositions .. in w h i c h .. objects .. can occur .." (3.203 + 3.311 + 4.23 , 5.01). - To wit ! **the existence of** ".. the elementary propositions .. the truth-arguments of propositions"\* (4.23 + 5.01) **presupposes the expression of t h e i r** "truth-possibilities" (4.3 , 4.41), **which are** ".. contained in .." (3.318, italics is mine) **well ordered, provable true or false, propositions of correspondence theory, .. pictures of the reality**" (4.06).

Logically, **if** "**both-and** **possibility**" of truth-values of ".. the elementary propositions .. the truth-arguments of propositions" (4.23 + 5.01) "**cannot be said**" (4.1212) **by** the ".. names with different meanings .. the composition of elementary propositions .. cannot be said" (4.1212 + 5.55) **e i t h e r**.

"The name occurs in the proposition only in the context of the elementary propositions". (2.021 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.22 , 3.23 , 3.3 , 4.23)

**That** ".. in the context of the elementary propositions" (4.23) **will** be read together with paragraphs 3.202 , 3.311 , 4.25 and 5.01. - Thus the ".. simple .. names .. occurs in the proposition only in the context .. the truth-arguments of propositions" (3.202 + 3.311 + 4.23 + 4.25 + 5.01).

Now the answer to the ! m a i n-question -

**"w h a t is the function of the "objects" ?"** (2.021 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.22 , 3.23 , 3.3 , 4.23 , 4.25 , 5.01)

is that -

**"the objects"** represent, **show** ".. **the truth-possibilities** of .. the truth-arguments of propositions .. **the conditions of the truth and falsehood of the propositions**" (1.1 , 2.06 , 4.1 , 4.25 , 4.3 + 4.41 + 5.01, italics is mine.)

and that is ! **precisely to s h o w** -

**".. the truth - possibilities of .." ! BOTH "truth" ! AND "falsity" of .." .. the truth-arguments of propositions"** (1.13 , 2.014 , 2.021 , 2.06 , 2.063 , 2.11 , 2.201 , 2.202 , 2.203 , 3.02 , 3.202 , 3.203 , 3.22 , 3.23 , 3.3 , 3.318 , 4.1 , 4.2 , 4.21 , 4.23 , 4.25 , 4.3 , 4.41 , 4.431 , 5 , 5.01)

**w h i c h**, then as an expression of Wittgenstein's "fundamental thought" (4.0312 , 4.128 , 6.4321), is that -

"What *can* be shown .. the logical form of reality .. **cannot** be said" (2.022 , 2.023 , 2.16 , 2.161 , 2.17 , 2.18 , 2.21 , 4.0641 , 4.121 + 4.1212 , 4.128 , 6.522)

It is clear, evident that there is no (general) method or algorithm to deduce ".. beforehand .. on one occasion .." (5.47) **all** of the well ordered propositions that can be proved true or false.

**IF** "objects" → ".. the names with different meanings .." (5.55), that are the basis, *express* the substance, i. e. "both-and" possibilities" of ".. truth-arguments of propositions" (5.01), of the well ordered, provable true or false propositions

".. **cannot** be said .. put .. into words .." (3.221 , 4.1212 + 6.522), **THEN** →

E R G O , as it is t h a t -

".. we are unable to give the n u m b e r of names with **different meanings** .." (5.55 , 5.5571),

".. simple .. names with different meanings .." (3.202 + 5.55), which constitute, represent ".. the substance of the world .." (2.021, italics is mine.) **a s a l l** the well ordered, **provable true or false propositions of correspondence theory** →

we can conclude Wittgenstein's "fundamental thought" →

"The possibility of propositions is based upon the principle of the representation of objects by signs. My fundamental thought is that the "logical constants" do not represent. That the logic of the facts cannot be represented". (4.0312 , 4.128 , 6.4321)

which is →

”.. My fundamental thought is that .. **the logic** of the facts / **the well ordered propositions that can be proved true or false / cannot be represented**” (1\* , 1.1 , 1.11 , 1.13 , 2 , 2.06 , 2.063 , 2.141 , 3 , 3.12 + 3.14 , 4 , 4.01 , **4.0312** , 4.06 , 4.128 , 6.4321).

and which says further, derives →

There is no (general) method or algorithm to deduce ”.. beforehand .. on one occasion ..” (5.47) **all** of the well ordered propositions that can be proved true or false.

”What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”. (7)

## Appendix IV

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus → <http://people.umass.edu/klement/tlp/tlp.pdf>

### Epilogue

It is obvious that Wittgenstein did not see the ”fundamental thought” (4.0312 , 4.128 , 6.4321) as a consistency-result of the correspondence theory (as I state in footnote 17).

Wittgenstein’s idea might indeed be that ”.. a picture of reality ..” (4.01) realises, that is proves automatically what ”it” **contains** - ”.. its agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts” (4.2) - given that he did see the ! (indeed possible) meaning of that → ”A function .. already contains the prototype of its own argument ..” (3.333) → ”.. a picture of reality ..” (4.01) **contains all its both ”truth” and ”falsehood” possibilities .. but did not see the ! (logical) trick how contingent ”falsehood” is non-contradictory possible.** Thus Wittgenstein might have thought that correspondence theory is invalid, and all what can be said in logic is *only* ”tautologies” and ”contradictories” (4.46 , 4.464).

”Das Mystische” in *Tractatus* (6.44 , 6.45 , 6.552) is therefore for Wittgenstein not (at all) truth- and proof-theoretical but but only ”.. mystical feeling” (6.45).

Paragraph 4.5 (at least) implies that the case is as above said.

Wittgenstein did not see that the ”fundamental thought” (4.0312 , 4.128 , 6.4321) as a consistency-result of the correspondence theory indeed derives something that can be seen ”mystical” although and precisely ”the mystical” is derived by the logic of correspondence theory itself.

It is indeed amazing that all the possible well ordered propositions of correspondence theory which represent reality\* ! since the dawn of time, as it\* ! have been or ! could have been, are already contained in universal-language (1.13 , 3.42). And yet none of those (contingent) propositions cannot be set out, decipher apriori by means of logic (5.551 , 6.4321) ; even if they ! All ! Exist.

Still a short note of my view of *Tractatus* vis-à-vis Kurt Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. If the law on contradiction is an axiom of correspondence theory, then in the end it must be so that not only the totality of ”.. pictures of the reality” (2.06 , 3 , 4 , 4.001 , 4.06), but as well not even a sing-

le ”.. picture of reality .. cannot be said” (4.01 + 4.1212 , 6.522).

This, since the fact that **all contingent** ”.. pictures of the reality” (4.06) must be **interrelated** (3.42 , 4.064 , **4.0641**) in order ! ”falsity” of the well formed propositions is non-contradictory possible. This means that correspondence theory cannot be proved consistent by the fact that *not even* a single ”.. picture of reality .. cannot be said .. put into words ..” (4.01 + 4.1212 + 6.552).

Yet, same fact (4.01 + 4.1212 + 6.522) ! **IMPLIES** the consistency of correspondence theory.

To wit, if a single well ordered proposition could be said, all other propositions would be derived as well. - It would mean to deduce either a contradiction or deduce all each other excluded groups of propositions, which ”each other excluded groups” is an expression that the logic of correspondence theory is consistent by circumventing what seemed an obvious contradiction in the logic of correspondence theory.